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In this paper, we consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to com-municate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of other play-
ers who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While everyone, the 
Announcer and the players, agree that coordination is desirable, the payoffs of the 
players at the various equilibria are unequal, and thus players disagree as to which 
equilibrium they should coordinate on.
What we argue in this paper is that in such coordination games with multiple 
equilibria in which payoffs are asymmetric, it may be advantageous for a utilitar-
ian benevolent Announcer to communicate in a coarse manner to the players when 
informing them of the value of payoff relevant states of the world. This can be ben-
eficial because such coarse communication may be able to mask the existing payoff 
asymmetry and thereby facilitate coordination if people find it hard to coordinate in 
games with asymmetric (unequal) equilibrium payoffs (see Crawford, Gneezy, and 
Rottenstreich 2008).1 As a result, our paper offers an additional reason for coarse 
communication beyond that offered by Crawford and Sobel (1982) since, in our 
game, the Announcer is communicating to a set of agents (rather than a single agent) 
1 Even if Players get equal payoffs, the Announcer might find it beneficial to conceal the information regarding 
additional coordination opportunities if one is presently prominent. Introducing additional coordination opportuni-
ties might interfere with coordination and lead to a decrease in efficiency.
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Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use  
of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games 
with Asymmetric Payoffs†
By Marina Agranov and Andrew Schotter*
We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to com-
municate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of 
players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While 
the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, 
since the payoffs of the players at the equilibria are unequal, they 
disagree as to which equilibrium is best. We demonstrate experimen-
tally that in such coordination games, in order to mask the asymme-
try of equilibrium payoffs, it may be advantageous for a utilitarian 
benevolent Announcer to communicate in an ambiguous or vague 
manner. (JEL C71, D81, D83)
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who interact strategically once they have received a message from the Announcer. In 
our setting, then, coarse communication is needed for both strategic and inequality 
aversion reasons.
To illustrate the problem, consider the two simple coordination games in Table 1, 
taken from Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008). The numbers in parenthe-
ses report the fraction of time each cell was chosen.
Note two features of these games. First, the labels associated with the strategies 
are not neutral. For example, if the game is interpreted as having two tourists choose 
which location to meet at if separated in Chicago (i.e., Schelling 1960), then it is 
clear that the (Sears, Sears) equilibrium is a more salient location to meet at since 
that is a well-known landmark, while the AT&T building is not. Second, note that 
the games differ only in the fact that while all equilibrium payoffs are symmetric 
and equal in Game 1, in Game 2 the equilibrium payoffs have the typical Battle-
of-the-Sexes payoff configuration, in which there is asymmetry (albeit extremely 
small) at the equilibrium for the players. 
The interesting thing demonstrated by Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008) 
is that, while in the absence of unequal payoffs in Game 1, players are successful in 
their ability to coordinate on the salient equilibrium (they do so 81 percent of the time 
and 82 percent overall), even small amounts of asymmetry (as in Game 2) dramati-
cally diminish the power of saliency to help their subjects coordinate (the coordination 
rate on the salient equilibrium drops to only 36 percent and to 52 percent overall). In 
other words, the saliency of the strategy label is not strong enough to overcome the 
equilibrium payoff differences, even though they are quite small. Even slight payoff 
asymmetry is enough to overcome the usefulness of the focal equilibrium points that 
Schelling (1960) relied on to solve such coordination problems.
While Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008) use a level-k analysis to 
explain these results, the question we ask here is what can be done to help our 
agents coordinate their actions and restore the power of the saliency to the labels 
employed? To answer this question we modify the typical sender-receiver cheap-talk 
game to include three players: an Announcer who observes a payoff relevant state of 
the world and announces it, and two Players who, upon hearing this announcement, 
play a coordination game with each other. The Announcer is able to choose the 
precision with which he communicates by using a more or less coarse information 
partition. Using a coarse information partition can mask the asymmetry of payoffs 
and make subjects believe that, on average, they are playing the game with equal 
payoffs. By doing this, people can go back to using the focal point to improve coor-
dination as they do when the actual payoffs are equal.
Table 1—Coordination Games from Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008)
Game 1 Game 2
Sears Tower AT&T building Sears Tower AT&T building
Sears Tower 5 , 5 0 , 0 Sears Tower 5.1 , 5 0 , 0
(81%) (9%) (36%) (24%)
AT&T building 0 , 0 5 , 5 AT&T building 0 , 0 5 , 5.1
(9%) (1%) (24%) (16%)
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In our experiments, we are interested in two related questions. The first focuses 
on the behavior of our Players and asks how they respond to Announcers using 
 different types of announcement strategies. To answer this question, in some of our 
treatments (Treatments 1, 2, 3, and 6) we replace the Announcer with a computer 
who is instructed to use one of two different announcement strategies which vary 
according to their coarseness. What we demonstrate is that coarseness allows the 
Announcer to mask the equity concerns in the problem and allows the salient loca-
tion to reemerge as the focal equilibrium.
In our computerized Announcer treatments, we investigate two types of coarse 
communication strategies: ambiguous intervals and vague words (natural  lan guage).2 
We compare their performance with a third communication strategy that fully reveals 
the payoffs of the game being played (truthful values). Ambiguous intervals achieve 
significantly higher coordination rates than the truthful values thereby determining 
that even when everyone, the Announcer and the players, agree that coordination is 
desirable, it may still be beneficial to make communication ambiguous. While the 
benefits of being vague are never as high as those associated with being ambiguous, 
our results do indicate that we lose relatively little by communicating in a vague 
manner (once subjects converge on the meaning of the words used). This is signifi-
cant because it may indicate that our daily use of natural language is not necessarily 
efficiency decreasing.
After establishing the power of using coarse information we study its limitations. 
Our results indicate that the symmetry in expected payoffs triggers the use of focal 
points when coarse strategies are used. If, however, ambiguous or vague strategies 
leave even a minute amount of expected payoff asymmetry, then words (intervals) 
lose their beneficial aspects and we are right back where we started.
Our second question shifts our focus from the Players to the Announcers and, in a 
separate set of treatments, we replace the computerized Announcer with real human 
subjects. Here we ask whether ordinary subjects are capable of discovering how to 
optimally manipulate vagueness to their advantage and whether the substitution of 
real Announcers decreases the welfare achieved by the subjects.3 What we find is 
that real human subjects are impressively creative in devising announcement strate-
gies both when they are left free to do so (Treatment 5) and when they are restricted 
in the vocabulary they can use (Treatment 4). Overall, we find that a significant 
proportion of the subjects acting as senders (40 percent in Treatment 4 and 58 per-
cent in Treatment 5) recognize the benefits of being vague and transmit the private 
information available to them in a coarse (vague) manner.
Our paper contributes to the growing experimental literature that investigates 
Schelling’s (1960) idea of focal points in the context of pure coordination games. 
The first experimental study on this topic is Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994a, 
1994b), in which the authors show that labeling strategies using words or pictures 
can generate a much higher coordination rate than random play would suggest. In 
2 We use Fine (1975) to define the notion of ambiguous and vague statements. According to Fine (1975), ambig-
uous statements are the ones that have multiple meanings, while vague statements may be deficient in meaning 
unless one knows exactly where the boundaries between words lie.
3 See also Agranov and Schotter (2011) for a discussion of communication strategies used by human Announcers 
in a different Announcement Game.
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other words, players make beneficial use of the familiar labels of strategies. Blume 
and Gneezy (2000) examine the role of endogenous focal points in pure coordina-
tion games that lack a  common description. Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2008) 
show that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium and is Pareto dominated 
by all Nash equilibria, may still attract the players’ choices. Dugar and Shahriar 
(2009) analyze the effectiveness of label-based focal points in Pareto-ranked coor-
dination games. Bardsley et al. (2010) design an experiment to distinguish between 
two alternative explanations (cognitive hierarchy theory and the theory of team rea-
soning) of how  players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination 
games. Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) test experimentally the variable frame 
theory, according to which different subjects perceive objects of choice differently. 
In their experiment, objects vary in characteristics such as shape, color, and size, and 
while differences in some characteristics are easy to spot right away, others require 
subjects to “notice” them, which is more a matter of psychological perception than 
mathematical logic. The recent paper by Blume and Gneezy (2010) studies coordi-
nation games in which sophisticated players can arrive at the unique choice by using 
logical inferences. Authors carefully control for nonpayoff-related symmetries and 
find that players play differently against themselves than against other player.4
Our paper is also related to the literature that explores the ways to improve coor-
dination in the Battle-of-the-Sexes games. The experimental literature has suggested 
several methods that can increase coordination rates in such games, for example: 
pre-play communication, the order of play and the presence of an outside option. 
Cooper et al. (1989) report that the coordination rate increases from 48 percent 
without communication to 95 percent with one-way pre-play communication and to 
55 percent with two-way communication (see also Costa-Gomez 2002 for the inter-
pretation of the experimental results of Cooper et al. 1989). Muller and Sadanand 
(2003) investigate the effects of order-of-play in the Battle-of-the-Sexes games and 
find that knowledge of the order of play affects the strategies chosen by participants 
and outcomes.5 Cooper et al. (1993) study the game in which one of the two players 
has a choice between playing a Battle-of-the-Sexes game or instead receiving a pre-
determined payoff. They find limited support for the forward induction argument, 
according to which choosing to play the game is a signal about intended action.
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature that studies vagueness property of 
language. Lipman (2009) argues that one needs a model of bounded rationality to 
explain the use of vague terms in natural language. Blume and Board (2009) and 
De Jaegher (2003) show that communication with a vague language may mitigate 
conflict and thus increase welfare. Finally, Serra-Garcia, van Damme, and Potters 
(2011) experimentally study communication between leaders and followers in 
sequential public good games. They find that in some states of the world the leader 
4 The game we study in this paper differs from the ones studied by Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) and by 
Blume and Gneezy (2010) in that there is no ambiguity about the focal point: Empire State Building is an obvious 
focal point in our coordination game.
5 In Muller and Sadanand (2003), in the treatment in which a second-mover is not informed about the choice of 
the first-mover, subjects play the equilibrium in which the first-mover gets a higher payoff about 70 percent of the 
time. In the treatment in which the second-mover observes the choice of the first-mover they do that 87.5 percent 
of the time. These fractions represent a significant improvement in coordination rates compared to the cases where 
play is simultaneous (47 percent).
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has an incentive to lie to the follower about the state of the world. Using vague mes-
sages however, allows the leader to avoid lying. The authors document that when 
leaders are forced to be precise they lie in an optimal manner. When vague messages 
are allowed, leaders fail to optimally use them.
In this paper we will proceed as follows. In Section I we will describe the setup 
of the game. In Section II we describe the design of our experiments. In Section III 
we state our hypotheses and in Section IV we present the results. Section V offers 
some conclusions.
I. Setup
Consider the following “Announcement Game” (see Agranov and Schotter 2011) 
played by three players: an Announcer (A) and two Players  P 1 and  P 2 . In this game 
the first move is made by nature who randomly picks the value of a payoff relevant 
random variable, x—the State of Nature—from a known set of integers using a com-
monly known prior distribution F [⋅] which, for our purposes here, will be assumed 
to be uniform. After x is realized, the Announcer privately observes its value and 
makes a public announcement, m, which is commonly heard by the two Players in 
the game. Once an announcement about x is made, the Players are engaged in the 
finite simultaneous-move 2 × 2 game, Γ(x), whose payoffs depend on the true value 
of x. The payoff of the Announcer is equal to the sum of the Players’ payoffs; that 
is, the Announcer represents a benevolent planner in this game whose interests are 
to foster coordination.
In the experiment that follows, the game is phrased as a coordination game where 
the goal is to meet one’s partner in either one of two places in New York City: the 
Empire State Building (ES) or the AXA building (AXA). They choose one of their 
two actions and payoffs are then determined. The game they play, Γ(x), appears in 
Table 2.
Moreover, as we stated in the Introduction, in some treatments the announcer 
is a computer while in others it is a human subject. That is, in the computerized 
announcer treatment, after the value of x is drawn from the specified distribution, 
the computer makes an announcement describing the value of x according to one 
of the three communication strategies programmed by the software. We will dis-
cuss later which communication strategies were used by the computerized and real 
Announcers and what information was given to the subjects in each treatment.
Note that in the game Γ(x) the payoffs depend on the value of x realized. As x var-
ies over the set {1, 2, 3, 4} we see Γ(x) vary over the following four games in Table 3.
When x takes on the value of 1, 2, or 3 the game defined has the structure of a 
Battle-of-the-Sexes game while when x = 4 there is a unique Pareto optimal equilib-
rium. We included the Γ(4) game only for technical purposes and hence will not spend 
much time discussing it.6 Our main interest is in games Γ(1) − Γ(3). In these games 
6 The reason we included Γ(4) in the design was the following. Imagine the game described above where x takes 
on only values 1, 2, or 3 with equal chances. In that game, the Announcer who is aware of the coordination problem 
in games with asymmetric payoffs (see Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich 2008) would not announce anything 
upon learning the state of the world, because making any informative announcement will lead to inefficient mis-
coordination due to asymmetry in payoffs. Hence in such setting there is no place to distinguish between ambiguity 
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notice that only in the middle game, where x = 2, are the equilibrium payoffs equal so 
if the players knew that x = 2, while the players still face a game with two equilibria, 
the payoffs at those equilibria would be the same so no equity issues exist. Moreover, 
the strategies are labeled in a particular way so that one meeting place is focal, the 
Empire State Building, while the other is not, the AXA building. We do this because 
as Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008) have demonstrated, when there are 
no payoffs asymmetry (equity concerns), players are easily able to coordinate around 
the focal equilibrium and choose Empire State. However, as we have seen above, they 
also demonstrate that even the slightest introduction of payoff asymmetry leads people 
to ignore the salience of the focal equilibrium and have trouble coordinating. When 
x = 1 or x = 3, the asymmetry issue raises its head and a tension arises as to which 
equilibrium strategy to choose. Such tensions have been shown to inhibit equilibrium 
coordination as we have seen in the Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008) 
results above and Cooper et al. (1993).
A. how coarse information can Enhance coordination
We start by demonstrating that transmitting the value of x using a coarse partition 
allows the Announcer to mask the payoff asymmetry in the Announcement game 
described above and allows the salient location to reemerge as the focal equilibrium. 
The idea is to make the Players think that on average they are playing the game 
with symmetric payoffs, in which case they can go back to using the focal point to 
improve coordination as they do when the actual payoffs are symmetric.
and vagueness. The existence of x = 4 makes the game more interesting and the role of the Announcer relevant, as 
he/she is faced with the question of how to partially transmit the information about x in order to separate between 
games with multiple (x < 4) and unique (x = 4) equilibria and also to avoid mis-coordination due to the asym-
metric payoffs when x < 4.
Table 2—The Game Γ(x)
ES AXA
ES 4x + 1, x + 7 0, 0
AXA   0, 0 if x < 4 x + 7, 4x + 1
25, 25 if x = 4
Table 3—The Games Γ(1), Γ(2), Γ(3), and Γ(4)
The Game Γ(1) The Game Γ(2)
ES AXA ES AXA
ES 5, 8 0, 0 ES 9, 9 0, 0
AXA 0, 0 8, 5 AXA 0, 0 9, 9
The Game Γ(3) The Game Γ(4)
ES AXA ES AXA
ES 13, 10 0, 0 ES 17, 11 0, 0
AXA 0, 0 10, 13 AXA 25, 25 11, 17
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Consider the following communication strategy of the Announcer, which we 
will call an Intervals strategy. According to this strategy the Announcer would 
announce “x is 1, 2, or 3” if in fact x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, or “x is 4” if x = 4. Note that 
when the former announcement is made, the expected value of x is 2 and so, on 
average, the Players can expect to be playing Γ(2) whose equilibria yield a payoff 
of 9 to each Player. Playing Γ(2) does not solve the coordination problem for the 
subjects since there are still two equilibria, but it does give them a common inter-
est in coordinating since there are no equity concerns raised by the asymmetry in 
payoffs. We would therefore expect the Players to coordinate on the Empire State 
Building since it is focal.
The Intervals strategy described here is not the only coarse communication strat-
egy that can mask the payoffs asymmetry. Consider, for example, the  following 
Words strategy: “x is low” is announced when x ∈ {1, 2, 3} and “x is high” is 
announced when x = 4. This Words strategy is similar to the Intervals strategy 
except instead of announcing a sub-interval into which x falls, the Announcer uses 
words (natural language) from a pre-selected vocabulary. The difference between 
using words (i.e., “x is low” and “x is high”) instead of intervals (i.e., “x is 1, 2, or 
3” and “x is 4”) is the difference between an attempt to be vague instead of ambig-
uous. According to Fine (1975) a statement is vague if it is deficient in meaning 
while it is ambiguous if it lacks a unique interpretation. In our case, a statement 
“x is 1, 2, or 3” is ambiguous because it does not have a unique meaning, i.e., x 
could be one of three values, while a statement that “x is low” has no meaning at 
all because we have no idea of where the boundary between one potential word 
used starts and another ends. For example, if a two word vocabulary, “low” and 
“high” is used, stating that x was “low” tells us nothing unless we know where the 
dividing line is between “low” and “high.”
Of course once subjects reach a common understanding of the cutoff point 
between the words “low” and “high,” the words become identical to the ambiguous 
intervals, due to Fine’s (1975) definition.
In the computerized Announcer treatments that follow, we will compare the per-
formance of the three types of communication strategies used by the computerized 
Announcer:
•	 the	Values strategy according to which the computer truthfully reports the true 
value of x drawn at the beginning of the game;
•	 the	Intervals strategy according to which the computer announces “x is 1, 2, or 
3” when x ∈ {1, 2, 3} and “x is 4” when x = 4; and
•	 the	Words strategy according to which the computer announces “x is low” 
when x ∈ {1, 2, 3} and “x is high” when x = 4.
If we can demonstrate that our three person society achieves higher payoffs when 
coarse communication strategies (such as intervals or words) are used than when 
true values are used, and if we link the poor performance in the true Values treatment 
to the payoffs asymmetry, then we think we have demonstrated a rationale for using 
coarse information even when everyone, the Announcer and the players, agree that 
coordination is desirable.
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B. real Announcers
Our computerized treatments focus on the behavior of the Players and their 
ability to coordinate given pre-determined (and optimal) computerized (word and 
 interval) announcement strategies. The idea behind the computerized treatments is 
that in the real world Announcers are likely to be sophisticated institutional agents 
who should be capable of employing the optimal degree of vagueness or ambigu-
ity. The obvious question is whether “normal people” functioning as Announcers 
would be capable of figuring out how to communicate in a sophisticated manner. To 
investigate this question we run two treatments with real announcers where they are 
limited in the vocabulary we allow them to use. In one treatment (Treatment 4) our 
laboratory announcers are only able to announce values to describe the values of x 
they observe. In other words, they are allowed to make statements such as “x is 2” 
or “x is 4.” In Treatment 5, on the other hand, they are capable of announcing that x 
is one of any combination of values. For example, in Treatment 5 an announcer can 
announce “x is 1 or 2” or “x is 1, 2, or 3,” etc.
Note that while the vocabulary in Treatment 4 appears to be restrictive, it is actu-
ally at least as flexible as the word strategy used by our computerized Announcers 
since a strategy of announcing say “x is 1” whenever x is 1, 2, or 3, and “x is 4” when 
x is 4 is equivalent to an optimal Words strategy where “x is 1” replaces “x is low” 
and “x is 4” replaces “x is high.” Likewise our vocabulary in Treatment 5 can easily 
replicate an interval strategy as described before.
As a result, the vocabularies available to our subjects permit a considerable 
amount of strategic flexibility and our goal in running Treatment 4 and 5 is to see 
how creative subjects are in discovering the optimal way to use them.
C. Limitations of coarse information
After establishing the power of using coarse information we study its limitations. 
We will address the following questions: What is the necessary condition for coarse 
information to facilitate coordination? What property of coarse information triggers 
the use of the focal points?
There are two possible explanations for why the Intervals or the Words strategies 
discussed in the previous section may help coordination. The first explanation sug-
gests that it is the uncertainty about the game being played that triggers the use of 
focal points. In other words, when the Players observe message “x is 1, 2, or 3” or “x 
is low,” they know that they are playing one of three possible games, but they don’t 
know which one. One might hypothesize that in this circumstance, Players resort to 
playing the focal equilibrium as it is the only common feature in all three games, 
each of which is a candidate for the actual game being played. The second explana-
tion attributes the use of the focal strategies to the equity of the expected payoffs that 
the Players face when the Announcer reports “x is 1, 2, or 3” or “x is low.” Indeed, 
when “x is 1, 2, or 3” or “x is low” is reported, the Players may correctly anticipate 
that on average they are playing the game with symmetric payoffs. In other words, 
the labels of the strategies become prominent only when actual or expected payoffs 
of both Players in both equilibria are symmetric.
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To distinguish the two proposed mechanisms, we study a modification of the 
Announcement Game described above, in which everything is the same except x 
takes values {1, 3⁄2, 3, 4} with equal probabilities instead of {1, 2, 3, 4}. In this modi-
fied game, when the computerized Announcer reports “x is 1, 3⁄2, or 3” the Players 
can expect to play the game shown in Table 4.
In other words, using a coarse partition to report the value of x does not eliminate 
asymmetry in expected terms: the Players are still faced with the multiple-equilibria 
game in which they get unequal expected payoffs at the various equilibria. If the 
uncertainty about the game being played is what triggers the use of the focal point, 
then we should observe similar coordination rates on the (ES, ES) equilibrium when 
“x is low” is reported in both the Words and the Word s modified treatments. If, however, 
focal points are triggered only when Players face a game with symmetric expected 
payoffs, then after the announcement “x is low,” the (ES, ES) equilibrium will be 
played less often in the Word s modified treatment compared with the Words treatment.
II. Experimental Procedures and Design
All of the treatments were run at the laboratory of the Center for Experimental 
Social Science (CESS) at New York University. In total 279 subjects participated, 
drawn from the general undergraduate population in the university by e-mail solici-
tations. Each treatment lasted approximately 1 hour and average payoffs were $25.
In all treatments, subjects arrived at the lab and were divided into groups of two 
or three depending on whether the Announcer was real or computerized in the treat-
ment they performed. Those subjects designated as Players were assigned to be 
either Player 1 or Player 2. The role of the Announcer was performed either by 
a computer (Treatments 1–3 and 6) or by a third subject (Treatments 4–5). If the 
Announcer was computerized the computer would transmit the value of x in either a 
vague, ambiguous, or precise manner. The identity of the subjects they were paired 
with was not known to the subjects. Each session was performed with a set of dif-
ferent subjects.
Let us concentrate on the computerized treatments first. In all these treatments, a 
strangers protocol was used so after each round of the 40 round experiment subjects 
were randomly allocated a new pair member.7 All four treatments with  computerized 
Announcers consisted of two parts. In the Values-Intervals experiment the subjects 
first engaged in the Γ(x) game for 20 rounds during which time the computerized 
7 Subjects were paid based on the total amount of tokens earned on all rounds of the experiment, which was 
converted into US dollars using the rate 20 tokens  = $1. In addition, subjects received $5 participation fee for 
completing the experiment.
Table 4—The Game Γ(11⁄6)
ES AXA
ES 50⁄6, 53⁄6 0, 0
AXA 0, 0 53⁄6, 50⁄6
86 AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MicroEconoMics MAy 2012
Announcer announced the true value of x before each round.8 This was done to allow 
us to see how well people were able to coordinate when they saw the actual game 
they were playing complete with its inequitable equilibria (at least when x ≠ 2). 
After playing this game 20 times, the subjects then played Γ(x) but this time the 
Announcer used an interval strategy to communicate. In this strategy the Announcer 
would either announce “x is 1, 2, or 3” if in fact x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, or x = 4 otherwise. 
This strategy of the Announcer was common knowledge amongst the subjects and 
at the end of each round subjects learned the actual value of x.9
In the Intervals-Values experiment everything was the same as in the Values-
Interval experiment except for the order of the announcement strategies used by the 
computerized Announcer. Subjects first played the game in which the Announcer 
used the interval strategy described above for 20 rounds they played the game in 
which the true value of x was announced before each round for 20 rounds. This treat-
ment was done to investigate whether there is an order effect for treatments.
The Values-Words experiment was identical to the Values-Intervals experiment 
except for the fact that instead of using interval strategies in the second 20 rounds, 
the computerized Announcer used words as a communication device. Here the 
announcement strategy was to announce “x is low” if x ∈ {1, 2, 3} and “x is high” 
if x = 4. This strategy was not known to the subjects so they had to figure out the 
vocabulary of the Announcer, but they did know that he was using a fixed language 
which did not vary during the treatment. As before, at the end of each round subjects 
learned the actual value of x.
Our two Human-Announcer treatments were identical to our computerized 
ones except for the fact that the computerized Announcer was replaced with a real 
human subject whose task was to announce the value of x to two other Players 
after observing it. Subjects that participated in this treatment were randomly 
divided into groups of three. One of the subjects in each group was assigned to 
be an Announcer and the other two subjects were assigned to be Players 1 and 2. 
Subjects stayed in the same groups and kept the same roles for the whole dura-
tion of the treatment. At the beginning of each round, the Announcer observed 
the value of x drawn by the computer from the set {1, 2, 3, 4} and chose what 
announcement to make to Players 1 and 2 as described above. In Treatment 4 the 
strategy space of the Announcer was restricted in that the Announcer could report 
a single value of x to the other Players. Hence, an announcement “x is 3” or “x is 2” 
could be made but not more complicated statements such as “x is 2 or 3” or “x is 
1, 2, or 3.” After hearing the announcement the Players played the game Γ(x). At 
the end of each round, all subjects learned the true value of x, the announced value 
of x, as well as their payoffs. While this strategy space appears to be restrictive, as 
we will see later, it actually allowed for a wide variety of strategies on the part of 
the Announcer allowing him, to replicate the word strategies used by the comput-
erized Announcers discussed above.
In Treatment 5 we allowed our human announcers a larger vocabulary by allow-
ing them to make compound statements where they could use any combination of 
8 The value of x was drawn independently in each session, in each round and for each pair.
9 The complete instructions for the Values-Intervals experiment are presented in online Appendix A.
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values in their announcements such as “x is 2 or 3” or “x is 1, 2, or 3” etc. We ran 
these treatments to study whether we can expect human Announcers to opt for the 
coarse communication strategy anticipating that this strategy could enhance coor-
dination by masking payoff asymmetries. We ran Treatment 5 to see if allowing 
greater strategic freedom on the part of the Announcer could enhance the welfare 
of our subjects.
The reason we used fixed matching in the human Announcers treatments is that 
subjects have to establish the convention of what the announcements mean in order 
to have a shot at reaching coordination when hearing those announcements. If one 
constantly changes players and announcers, it becomes extremely hard to interpret 
and learn the meaning of the announcements made. Moreover, as we see in our data, 
different Announcers used different announcement strategies, the performance of 
which would be hard to assess if we were to implement a random matching design. 
While repeated game behavior is a legitimate concern when fixed matching is used, 
in our results we do not see that such behavior played any significant role.
To test the limits of course communication, we also run the Values-Words modi-
fied experiment, which was identical to the Values-Words experiment except that 
x—the State of Nature—took values {1, 3⁄2, 3, 4} with equal probability instead of 
{1, 2, 3, 4}. In the first 20 rounds of this treatment the true value of x was announced 
before each round and in the last 20 rounds the following Words strategy was used 
to communicate value of x: “x is low” if x ∈ {1, 3⁄2, 3} and “x is high” if x = 4.10
Our experimental design is summarized in Table 5.
For the analysis of the experimental data, we will often refer to the six treat-
ments: Values, Intervals, Words, Word s modified , Restricted, and Unrestricted Human 
Announcers treatments.
III. Hypotheses
Given our discussion above we can define a set of hypotheses that can be tested 
using the data generated by our experiment. We will first state the hypotheses 
related to our Computerized-Announcer treatments (Treatments 1–3) and then 
our Human-Announcer treatments (Treatments 4 and 5). Hypothesis 7 returns to 
the Computerized-Announcer treatment (Treatment 6) to investigate the impact of 
asymmetric payments in the “modified game.”
Computerized-Announcers Hypotheses: We use the Values treatment to repli-
cate the results of Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008). In their paper they 
demonstrate that when no equity concerns exist and some strategy is made focal 
by labeling (as in our Empire State Building strategy) then subjects are capable of 
using the focal strategy as a coordination device. In our experiment this implies 
that when x = 2 we should see far more successful coordination on the (ES, ES) 
10 In the Values-Words modified treatment, as well as in any other treatment, subjects were not told the expected 
value of x and had no access to calculators or computational aids. There was a technical problem with one of the 
sessions in this treatment. This is why we have only 18 rounds in the values part of one of the sessions as opposed 
to 20 rounds.
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equilibrium than when x = 1 or x = 3. This conjecture is summarized by the fol-
lowing hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1: “coordination Failure with Asymmetric Payoffs.” in the Values 
treatment, subjects play the (Es, Es) equilibrium more often when x = 2 is 
announced than when x = 1 or x = 3 is announced.
The trick of using partial information is then to make subjects think that, on aver-
age, they are playing Γ(2) and hence increase coordination. This, of course, relies 
on them playing the same way when x is known to be equal to 2 as when they only 
expect to be playing Γ(2) due to the ambiguous announcement made. This yields 
the second hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 2: “coarse information increases Efficiency.” subjects play the 
(Es, Es) equilibrium equally often when x = 2 is reported in the Values treatment 
and when “x is 1, 2, or 3” is reported in the intervals treatment.
As Hypothesis 2 states, we expect intervals to perform well because not only 
does it mask the asymmetric payoffs (inequity problem) but also, while ambiguous, 
it is still precise about the range of values that x can take in any round. Because 
words are vague, they require that the Players reach an understanding about what 
those words mean. This is potentially harder, so we would expect that before such 
a common understanding is reached, words should perform worse than intervals. 
However, after our subjects come to a common understanding of what the words 
Table 5—Experimental Design
Treatment (# of sessions) State of nature Sequence Announcer # of subjects
Treatment 1 
 Values-Intervals 
 (3 sessions)
x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} 20 rounds–value of x announced 
20 rounds–intervals strategy  
“x is 1, 2, or 3” if x ∈ {1, 2, 3}  
“x is 4” if x = 4
Computer 50
Treatment 2 
 Intervals-Values 
 (2 sessions)
x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} 20 rounds–intervals strategy  
“x is 1, 2, or 3” if x ∈ {1, 2, 3}  
“x is 4” if x = 4  
20 rounds–value of x announced
Computer 32
Treatment 3 
 Values-Words 
 (2 sessions)
x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} 20 rounds–value of x announced 
20 rounds–words strategy  
“x is low” if x ∈ {1, 2, 3}  
“x is high” if x = 4
Computer 44
Treatment 4 
 Real announcers values  
  only  
 (3 sessions)
x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} 20 rounds Real subjects 48
Treatment 5 
 Real announcers  
  unrestricted  
 (4 sessions)
x ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} 20 rounds Real subjects 63
Treatment 6 
 Values-Words modified 
 (2 sessions)
x ∈ {1, 3⁄2, 3, 4} 20 rounds–value of x announced 
20 rounds–words strategy  
“x is low” if x ∈ {1, 3⁄2, 3}  
“x is high” if x = 4
Computer 42
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mean, i.e., where the cutoff is between “low” and “high,” there should be no differ-
ence between the performance of the intervals and the words. This leads us to the 
third hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 3: “Vagueness versus Ambiguity.” the Words strategy performs worse 
than the interval strategy at the beginning of the experiment, however, the performance 
of the Words and the interval strategies is comparable by the end of the experiment.
Human Announcers Hypotheses: As we indicated in our Introduction, we intro-
duced the Human Announcer treatment in order to get an insight into whether human 
subjects would be adept at using the strategic freedom we give them to mask the states 
of nature they observe in a welfare enhancing manner. This leads us to three hypotheses.
HYPOTHESIS 4:  “Announcement strategies.” When human announcers are free to 
announce either any values of x (as in treatment 4) or any combination of values of 
x that they wish (as in treatment 5), they opt for nontruth telling strategies by using 
strategies that are noninvertible.
HYPOTHESIS 5: “invertible vs noninvertible strategies.” Announcers that used 
invertible announcement strategies achieved lower welfare than those that used 
noninvertible strategies to mask inequality in payoffs.
HYPOTHESIS 6: “strategic Freedom vs restrictions.” the efficiency of Announcers 
is no greater in treatment 4 where they are restricted by having to announce values 
than in treatment 5 where they have more strategic freedom.
For our final hypothesis we return to our Computerized announcement treatment 
and investigate the impact of payoff asymmetries on behavior. As we will be shown 
the frequency of (ES, ES) equilibrium play is the same in the last five rounds of the 
Words and the Intervals treatments when “x is low” or “x is 1, 2, or 3” are announced. 
This suggests that when vagueness or ambiguity is used to mask the true state of the 
world and when the expected payoffs implied by this camouflage are symmetric, 
both words and intervals are equivalent. However, we expect that a small change of 
the underlying distribution of the State of Nature (as in the Values-Words modified 
treatment) may significantly change the coordination rates. If this is true, then it 
would imply that what triggers the use of the focal points is not the uncertainty about 
the game being played, but rather the symmetry of the expected payoffs.
HYPOTHESIS 7: “Equality in Expectations.” subjects play the (Es, Es) equilib-
rium more often in the Words than in the Word s modified treatment when “x is low” is 
announced.
IV. Results
In this section we will describe the results by investigating each of our seven 
hypotheses in sequence.
90 AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MicroEconoMics MAy 2012
HYPOTHESIS 1: “coordination Failure with Asymmetric Payoffs.”
Hypothesis 1 asks whether in the Values treatment, where the true value of x 
was announced, the incidence of coordination on the (ES, ES) equilibrium is less 
when x = 1 or x = 3 is reported than when x = 2 is reported. Table 6 reports the 
distribution of outcomes in the Values treatment for different announcements. To 
construct Table 6, and all other relevant tables, we pooled observations from the first 
20 rounds of the Values-Words and the Values-Intervals experiments as well as the 
last 20 rounds of the Intervals-Values experiments. The same qualitative results can 
be obtained by looking separately at the experiments in which the Values treatment 
was performed before and after the Intervals treatment. In other words, we find no 
order of treatments effect by comparing the data from the Values-Intervals and the 
Intervals-Values experiments. In both the Values-Intervals and the Intervals-Values 
experiments the incidence of coordination on the (ES, ES) equilibrium was signifi-
cantly higher when x = 2 was reported than when x = 1 or x = 3 was reported. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the null that the distribution of outcomes 
played in the Values-Intervals experiment was the same as the one in the Intervals-
Values experiment for every value of x reported ( p > 0.1 in all cases).
As we see in Table 6, when x = 1 (x = 3) was announced subjects coordi-
nated on the (ES, ES) equilibrium 33 percent (41 percent) of times, while the same 
 coordination rate was 81 percent when x = 2 was announced.11 It is important to 
point out that this result is a function of two things, the equity of the payoffs when 
x = 2 and the labeling of the strategies.
To perform statistical analysis we will construct the measure that indicates how 
often each subject chose focal strategy Empire State when various announcements 
were made by the computerized Announcer (one observation per subject). Figure 1 
below depicts the histograms of this measure for x = 1, x = 2, and x = 3 (there are 
126 observations in each histogram).
Remarkably, when x = 2 was announced, 80 percent of subjects always played 
the focal strategy ES, while there is a disperse distribution for x = 1 or x = 3 
announcements. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test confirms what 
we see in Figure 1: the null that these samples come from the same population is 
rejected for x = 1 and x = 2 ( p < 0.01) as well as for x = 3 and x = 2 ( p < 0.01).
11 For the reasons described above, our main interest is in games Γ(1) − Γ(3) and not in game Γ(4) which has 
unique Nash equilibrium (AXA, ES). However, one can use the frequency of equilibrium play in Γ(4) to calibrate 
an underlying error or the fraction of players that behave in a nonrational way. When x = 4 was reported in Values 
treatment, subjects played the equilibrium of the game 80 percent of the times in all 20 rounds and 100 percent of 
the times in the last five rounds, which suggests that players have no problem of coordinating on a unique equilib-
rium when there is no conflict of interests.
Table 6—Distribution of Outcomes in the Values Treatment
Values: x = 1 Values: x = 2 Values: x = 3
(307 obs) (328 obs) (301 obs)
ES AXA ES AXA ES AXA
ES 33% 24% ES 81% 9% ES 41% 21%
AXA 32% 11% AXA 9% 1% AXA 25% 13%
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Our results are consistent with those of Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich 
(2008) since they indicate that even a slight deviation from equity can lead to a 
decrease in the rate of coordination even when one strategy is made focal.
HYPOTHESIS 2: “coarse information increases Efficiency.”
Hypothesis 2 is the main hypothesis of this paper since it aims to show that when 
we alter our announcement strategy away from true values and towards ambiguous 
intervals we are capable of achieving higher efficiencies. Table 7 presents the distri-
bution of outcomes across the Values and Intervals treatments where in the former 
case an announcement that “x is 2” is made while in the later case an announcement 
of “x is 1, 2, or 3” is made.12
As we can see from Table 7, the performance of our subjects when they heard an 
ambiguous announcement “x is 1, 2, or 3” was comparable to the one when they knew 
for sure that x was equal to 2 in the last five rounds of the game. For example, in the 
last five rounds, subjects played (ES, ES) 78 percent of the time when intervals were 
12 Again, we pooled together the observations from the Values-Intervals and the Intervals-Values experiments 
because we observe no significant difference in the behavior of subjects when the Intervals strategy is played before 
or after the Values strategy.
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Figure 1. How Often Subjects Play ES in the Values Treatment
Table 7—Distribution of Outcomes in the Values Treatment When x = 2 and in the  
Intervals Treatment When “x is 1, 2, or 3” Is Announced
Values: x = 2 Intervals: “x is 1, 2, or 3” Intervals: “x is 1, 2, or 3”
All rounds (328 obs) All rounds (605 obs) Last 5 rounds (152 obs)
ES AXA ES AXA ES AXA
ES 81% 9% ES 69% 15% ES 78% 13%
AXA 9% 1% AXA 13% 3% AXA 7% 2%
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used while when values were used they did so 81 percent of the time. The fraction 
of times subjects played the (ES, ES) equilibrium in the Values treatment in the last 
five rounds is not much different when we consider all rounds. In the last five rounds 
(ES, ES) was played 80 percent of the time compared with 81 percent in all rounds.
In the experimental literature, it is a common observation that subjects take time 
to get used to a game and understand its mechanism. Our experiment is not an 
exception. Figure 2 shows the distribution of how often each subject played their ES 
strategy in the first 15 and in the last 5 rounds of the Intervals treatment.13
Comparing the distributions in Figure 2 to the one when x = 2 was announced 
in the Values treatment (see Figure 1 ) we observe that 78 percent of subjects 
always play the ES strategy when they hear announcement “x is 1, 2, or 3” in the 
last five rounds of the Interval treatment, which is very similar to the behavior 
observed in the Values treatment when x = 2 in which 80 percent of subjects 
always played the ES strategy when they heard “x = 2.” This proportion is, how-
ever, smaller in the first 15 rounds of the Intervals treatment, in which only 32 
percent of subjects always play the ES strategy when they observe “x is 1, 2, or 3.” 
According to the Wilcoxon matched-pairs sign-ranks test, we reject the null that 
the sample of observations when x = 2 was announced in the Values treatment 
and “x is 1, 2, or 3” in the first 15 rounds of the Interval treatment come from the 
same population ( p < 0.01) and we cannot reject the same null for x = 2 in the 
Values treatment and “x is 1, 2, or 3” in the last five rounds of the Interval treat-
ment ( p = 0.1871).
To sum up, the use of the ambiguous announcement strategy has helped our 
agents to overcome the coordination problems endemic in situations where asym-
metry is a problem and to obtain higher payoffs.
13 There are 82 observations in both histograms—one observation per Player.
Figure 2. How Often Subjects Play ES in the Intervals Treatment When x < 4
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HYPOTHESIS 3: “Vagueness versus Ambiguity.”
In Hypothesis 2 we have confirmed the idea that coarse information in the form 
of ambiguous intervals can improve coordination rates over transmitting true values 
of x. However, intervals are not the only possible coarse communication strategy 
that one might use. Another way to hide the asymmetry in payoffs is to use the same 
partition as before (x < 4 and x = 4) but instead of announcing the sub-interval in 
which x falls, attach a word to each sub-interval and report this word.
Table 8 presents the distribution of outcomes when x < 4 in the first 15 and last 
five rounds of the Words treatment.
In the first 15 rounds of the Words treatment, after observing the “x is low” 
announcement, subjects coordinated on the Empire State equilibrium 57 percent 
of the time, while they did so 74 percent of the time in the last five rounds when 
words were no longer vague. That is, once the meaning of the words was commonly 
understood, the Words strategy achieved coordination rates similar to those of the 
Intervals strategy (see Table 7). This is confirmed by the Wilcoxon rank-sum test: 
the null that the sample of individual plays of the ES strategy in the Words and in the 
Intervals treatments come from the same population is rejected in the first 15 rounds 
( p < 0.05) and cannot be rejected in the last five rounds ( p = 0.5974).
We will now compare the performance of the Words and Intervals strategies with 
that of the Values strategy. Table 9 reports the LOGIT regression with dummy vari-
ables for the Words and the Intervals treatments, while the Values treatment serves 
as the base group.
As we can see from Table 9, in the first 15 rounds of the experiment subjects coor-
dinated on the focal equilibrium (ES, ES) more often when the Intervals strategy was 
used than when the Words or the Values strategies were used. The picture becomes dif-
ferent when subjects had enough time to learn the cutoff between “low” and “high” and 
converge to the common interpretation of words. At this point (the last five rounds), 
words are no more vague and both words and intervals outperform values.
To summarize, at first when subjects are still learning the meaning of the words, 
the Words strategy achieves similar coordination rates as the Values strategy, while 
the Intervals strategy outperforms the Values strategy. However, once the vocabulary 
becomes common knowledge, there is no difference between words and intervals 
and both outperform the truthful values.
human Announcers hypotheses:
Having confirmed (through the use of computerized announcers) our hypoth-
esis that coarse information can enhance coordination by masking payoffs asymme-
try we now ask whether human Announcers can figure this out by themselves. Put 
Table 8—Distribution of Outcomes in the Words Treatment when x < 4
Words: “x is low” Words: “x is low”
first 15 rounds (249 obs) last 5 rounds (85 obs)
ES AXA ES AXA
ES 57% 17% ES 74% 9%
AXA 20% 6% AXA 13% 4%
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 differently, can we expect human Announcers to understand that they might benefit 
both themselves and society by being vague?
To address this question we focus on our Human Announcers treatments. As you 
may recall, in Treatment 4, Announcers observed the actual value of x at the begin-
ning of each round and could announce any value to the two other Players, i.e., 
“x is 1,” “x is 2,” “x is 3,” or “x is 4.” In this treatment the Announcer’s “vocabu-
lary” was restricted to including only one of these four possible announcements. In 
Treatment 5, however, Announcers were not limited in their announcement strategy 
and could announce any set of states after observing the actual state x, i.e., “x is 1, 
2, or 3,” “x is 3 or 4,” “x is 2,” etc.
The main strategic consideration for subject Announcers in both experiments is 
whether to be strategic or truthful about the states they observe. This is equivalent to 
asking whether they will choose an invertible or noninvertible announcement strat-
egy. An invertible strategy is one where, for any given announcement, the state is 
uniquely defined. For example, the “truthful Values strategy” is invertible. A vague 
noninvertible strategy is one where there is not a one-to-one mapping from states to 
announcements as in the strategy of saying “x is 2” when x takes a value of 1, 2, or 
3, and reporting “x is 4” when x is equal to 4.
We call the later strategy the word strategy since it requires that the Players reach 
a common understanding that the announcement “x is 2” (or “x is 1,” or “x is 3”) 
is made when x takes values 1, 2, or 3.14 This Word strategy incorporates the idea 
that the Players may find it hard to coordinate on an equilibrium when they face 
asymmetric payoffs, and one way to avoid this problem is to disguise values of x 
for which the situation of asymmetry occurs. Because the strategy set was larger for 
Announcers in Treatment 5, the strategies used were more varied and complex than 
those discussed above. However, they still can be divided into those that were invert-
ible and those that were not. In our analysis below we will look at the announcement 
strategies used by Announcers in both Treatments 4 and 5, categorize them, and 
14 Even though this announcement strategy does not use actual words to describe value of x, it has all the features 
of the Words strategy, since Players need to infer the actual value of x from the announcement just like they do when 
words are used to describe x. This is why we will call it the Words strategy.
Table 9—LOGIT Regression when x < 4 (clustering by session)
First 15 rounds Last 5 rounds
Words 0.09 1.06* 
(0.26) (0.65)
Intervals 0.30** 1.18** 
(0.13) (0.35)
Constant 0.45** 0.18
(0.09) (0.17)
Observations 1,396 479 
log likelihood −913.02 −289.79 
note: Dependent variable is 1 if (ES, ES) was played and 0 otherwise, base group is the Values 
treatment and robust standard errors are in the brackets.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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compare their efficiencies both within and across treatments to see if the extra stra-
tegic flexibility accorded to Announcers in Treatment 5 led to greater efficiencies.
HYPOTHESIS 4: “Announcement strategies.”
We start by categorizing the types of announcement strategies that human 
Announcers used in Treatments 4 and 5. In order to classify subject Announcers 
according to the announcement strategy they used, we look at the behavior of each 
Announcer over the 20 rounds of the experiment and, for each strategy, ask how many 
observations would have to be removed from the dataset in order to fit the strategy 
exactly. A subject will be classified as belonging to a strategy if that strategy best 
describes his or her behavior, that is, minimizes the number of removed observations.15 
Table 10 presents all the strategies used by human Announcers in both treatments.
15 The set of all announcement strategies that we considered includes all possible partitions of the state space 
and all possible announcements for each partition.
Table 10—Announcement Strategies Used by Human Announcers  
in Treatments 4 and 5
Treatment 4 
observations
Treatment 5 
observations
Both 
fraction
Panel A. invertible announcement strategies
Strategy A1 (Truthful)
9 7 47%
“x is 1” when x = 1
“x is 2” when x = 2
“x is 3” when x = 3
“x is 4” when x = 4
Strategy A2 (Invertible Complex)
1 3%
“x is 1 or 2” when x = 1
“x is 2” when x = 2
“x is 2 or 3” when x = 3
“x is 4” when x = 4
Panel B. noninvertible announcement strategies
Strategy B1 (Words)
6 3 26%“x is 2” when x < 4
“x is 4” when x = 4
Strategy B2 (Words)
1 3%“x is 1” when x < 4
“x is 4” when x = 4
Strategy B3 (Words)
1 3%“x is 2 or 3” when x < 4
“x is 4” when x = 4
Strategy B4 (Words)
2 6%“x is 1, 2, or 3” when x < 4
“x is 4” when x = 4
Strategy B5 (Words)
1 3%“x is 1, 2, or 3” when x < 4
“x is 1, 2, 3, or 4” when x = 4
Strategy B6 (Words/Values)
3 9%
“x is 1 or 3” when x ∈ {1, 3}
“x is 2” when x = 2 
“x is 4” when x = 4 
15 19 100%
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In both treatments, the strategies we selected for each Announcer fit their behav-
ior remarkably well in that on average only 1.25 observations in Treatment 4 and 
1.4 observations in Treatment 5 needed to be removed before a perfect fit was 
achieved. In addition, the strategy we select as the best fitting strategy for the 
Announcer performed significantly better than the second best amongst all possible 
announcement strategies according to our metric. For example, in order to make the 
second best strategy fit the data as well as our first best, one needs to remove, on 
average, an additional 8.5 out of 20 observations in Treatment 4 and 10.25 out of 
20 observations in Treatment 5.16
In Treatment 4, we observe a significant proportion of Announcers using both 
invertible truthful and noninvertible Words strategies: out of 15 Announcers, 9 
(60 percent) used the truth-telling strategy and the remaining 6 (40 percent) used 
the Words strategy.
Despite the strategic freedom offered Announcers in Treatment 5, 42 percent of 
them (8 out of 19) persisted in using invertible strategies. While this percentage 
is down from the 60 percent of subjects using such strategies in Treatment 4, it 
is still considerable. The most popular such strategy was the truthful strategy, in 
which the Announcer simply reported the value of x he or she saw in each period 
(Strategy A1): 87.5 percent of all Announcers that used invertible strategies in 
Treatment 5 used the truthful strategy. The remaining 58 percent of Announcers 
used noninvertible strategies of various kinds. One popular group of noninvertible 
strategies is similar to the Words strategy observed in Treatment 4, in which the 
Announcer sends the same message to the Players when x takes values of 1, 2, and 
3 and another message when x is 4. The difference between strategies B1–B5 is 
the messages used to report x when the later is below 4 and the message used to 
report that x is 4. Notice that strategies B1–B5 use the same partition of the state 
space and they all require that the Players reach a common understanding of the 
message sent when x takes values 1, 2, or 3 and when x takes value of 4. The most 
popular strategy amongst the ones that use x < 4 and x = 4 partition is strategy 
B1, which reports “x is 2” when x < 4 and “ x is 4” when x = 4 (27 percent of 
Announcers that use noninvertible strategies use this one). Another popular strat-
egy that was used by 27 percent of all Announcers who employed noninvertible 
strategies is strategy B6 which disguises the value of x only when inequality prob-
lems may interfere with coordination (x = 1 and x = 3) and reveals x truthfully 
when this is not an issue (x = 2 and x = 4).
Overall, combining data from both treatments we see that half of human 
Announcers (17 out of 34) used invertible announcement strategies and another 
half used noninvertible strategies that hide the value of x when the inequality 
problem was present.
We will now compare the performance of these two groups of strategies in terms 
of efficiency.
16 There were also three Announcers (one in Treatment 4 and two in Treatment 5) who used strategies which 
were hard to classify. One would have to remove at least 9 out of 20 observations in order to classify these subjects 
into one of the strategies. We, therefore, exclude these Announcers from the analysis.
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HYPOTHESIS 5: “invertible vs noninvertible strategies.”
Given the results obtained in the Computerized-Announcers treatments, we 
would expect that the invertible announcement strategies would be less efficient 
than the noninvertible strategies since the later disguise the inequality of payoffs 
when this inequality may interfere with coordination. Table 11 presents the  average 
and median total profits of Announcers grouped by the type of announcement strat-
egy used (summed over all 20 rounds). Since the Announcers’ payoff is the sum 
of Players’ earnings, the profits of Announcers is a perfect indicator of the welfare 
captured by all subjects in a group.
As we see, the profits of the Announcers were higher when they disguised the 
actual value of x than when they revealed it to the Players (both means and medians 
preserve the same order). A Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejects the hypotheses that the 
distributions of Announcers’ profits came from the same population (z = 2.067 and 
p = 0.0388).17
Now that we established that noninvertible strategies performed better than the 
invertible ones, we will explore why this is the case. We will show that it is the 
inequality problem that stands in the way of achieving high coordination rates when 
the true value of x is revealed to the Players.
We first look at the invertible strategies and show that subjects play the 
(ES, ES) equilibrium more often when x = 2 than when x = 1 or x = 3 (see 
Table 12).
As we see, the incidence of coordination on the (ES, ES) equilibrium was sig-
nificantly higher when x = 2 was reported than when x = 1 or x = 3 was reported. 
When x = 1 (x = 3) was announced subjects coordinated on the (ES, ES) equilib-
rium 33 percent (39 percent) of times in the first 15 rounds and 22 percent (45 per-
cent) of the time in the last 5 rounds, while the same coordination rate was 71 percent 
when x = 2 was announced in the first 15 rounds and 77 percent in the last 5 rounds.
Disguising the value of x when x = 1 and x = 3 can mitigate the inequality prob-
lem and help subjects coordinate on the focal equilibrium (ES, ES). This can be 
seen by looking at the distribution of outcomes when x took values 1, 2, and 3, and 
noninvertible strategies B1–B6 were used (see Table 13).
To perform a statistical analysis we use the same measure as the one in the 
Computerized-Announcer treatments: this measure indicates how often each subject 
chose the focal Empire State strategy when various announcements were made by 
the human Announcers (one observation per subject). The Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
17 To perform the test, we used one observation per Announcer, which is the sum of the profits of the Announcer 
in all 20 rounds.
Table 11—Profits of Announcers, by Type of Announcement Strategy
Mean profits Median profits
Invertible strategies
375 tokens 388 tokensStrategies A1 and A2
Noninvertible strategies
449 tokens 471 tokensStrategies B1–B6
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cannot reject the hypothesis that the probability to the play focal strategy ES comes 
from the same distribution when an invertible strategies A1 and A2 are used and 
x = 2 is announced as when a noninvertible strategy B1–B6 is used and x below 4 
is announced (z = 1.517 and p = 0.1294).18 In other words, when the value of x is 
disguised from the Players, they play the ES strategy as often as they do when there 
is no inequality problem, i.e., x is known to equal 2. On the contrary, when invertible 
strategies are used and x = 1 or x = 3, subjects play the ES strategy far less often 
than when x = 2. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test rejects the null 
that these samples come from the same population (z = 2.745 and p = 0.0061 for 
x = 1 versus x = 2 and z = 2.291 and p = 0.0219 for x = 3 versus x = 2).
Finally, we ask whether the strategic flexibility awarded Announcers in 
Treatment 5 leads to greater efficiencies.
HYPOTHESIS 6: “strategic Freedom vs restrictions.”
Table 14 presents the average and the median total profits of the Announcers 
(summed over all 20 rounds), in Treatments 4 and 5.
As can be seen the mean and the median sum-of-player payoffs is actually 
higher in Treatment 4 where there is less strategic freedom. However, a Wilcoxon 
Rank-sum test shows that there is no statistical difference between Treatment 4 and 
Treatment 5 profits (z = 0.451 and p = 0.6520). This fact is interesting since it 
18 Notice that here we compare the performance of invertible strategies when x = 2 with the performance of 
the noninvertible strategies when x < 4. This is different from the exercise performed in Table 9, in which we are 
concerned with overall performance of invertible (Values) and noninvertible (Words and Intervals) strategies when 
x takes values below 4.
Table 13—Distribution of Outcomes when Noninvertible Strategies  
(B1–B6) Are Used
x < 4 x < 4
first 15 rounds (187 obs) last 5 rounds (60 obs)
ES AXA ES AXA
ES 64% 15% ES 83% 0%
AXA 12% 9% AXA 12% 5%
Table 12—Distribution of Outcomes when Invertible Strategies (A1 and A2) Are Used
x = 1 x = 2 x = 3
first 15 rounds (70 observations) first 15 rounds (55 observations) first 5 rounds (70 observations)
ES AXA ES AXA ES AXA
ES 33% 16% ES 71% 9% ES 39% 41%
AXA 43% 9% AXA 5% 15% AXA 13% 7%
x = 1 x = 2 x = 3
last 5 rounds (23 observations) last 5 rounds (22 observations) last 5 rounds (22 observations)
ES AXA ES AXA ES AXA
ES 22% 4% ES 77% 9% ES 45% 41%
AXA 57% 17% AXA 0% 14% AXA 5% 9%
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indicates that the vocabulary used by Announcers in Treatment 4, while restricted, 
was sufficient to yield an efficiency comparable to that in Treatment 5.
We conclude the analysis of the Human Announcers treatments by noting that a 
significant proportion of subject Announcers changed their strategy in the course 
of the experiment. Nine out of 17 Announcers (53 percent) that used noninvertible 
strategies started the experiment by truthfully announcing the value of x. However, 
after a few rounds they changed their strategy. Why did those Announcers change 
their strategy and others did not?
To answer this question we will look at the performance of the Players in the first 
rounds of the experiments. It turns out that those Announcers that changed their 
strategy experienced low coordination rates when x took values of 1 and 3 and they 
announced the truth. The typical example of what happened can be illustrated by 
an Announcer in Treatment 5, Session 2, Group 1. The first two times that x took 
values 1 and 3, this Announcer truthfully reported x to the Players. However, both 
these times, Players failed to coordinate on which equilibrium to play and ended up 
with zero payoffs. After those two failures, the Announcer switched to announcing 
“x is 1, 2, or 3” when x < 4.
The example above is not an exception. Those Announcers that switched from the 
truthful to the noninvertible announcement strategy experienced low coordination 
rates when x was equal to 1 and 3 and they reported the true value of x: in only 2 out 
of 14 instances (14 percent) did the Players managed to play the equilibrium when 
x = 1 or x = 3 was announced.19 On the contrary, the Announcers that decided to 
stick with the truth-telling strategy experienced higher coordination rate of 47 per-
cent the first time they announced the true value of x when x took values of 1 or 3 
and 53 percent the second time they did so. In other words, the decision to change 
the announcement strategy was triggered by the ability of the Players to coordinate 
on one of the equilibria when Players faced the game with unequal payoffs.
Reporting the true value of x is the natural starting point for an inexperienced 
Announcer since his interests coincide with the equilibrium of the game Γ(x) for 
every value of x and he might not realize immediately the problem of payoffs asym-
metry.20 However, after observing several coordination failures when payoffs are 
unequal, we might expect sophisticated Announcers to adjust their behavior and find 
a way to overcome this problem (by using the attraction of the focal point). This is 
precisely what happened in the experiment: those Announcers that experienced the 
19 Three Announcers announced the true value of x when x = 1 and x = 3 twice and got miscoordination both 
times, then changed their strategy. Four Announcers announced the true value of x once when x = 1 and x = 3, got 
miscoordination and changed their strategy. Finally, two Announcers reported x = 1 and x = 3 two times and got 
one miscoordination and then changed the strategy.
20 Moreover, a recent experimental work of Gneezy (2005) and Hurkens and Kartik (2009) documents that 
people have an intrinsic aversion to lying and, thus, telling the truth might be a natural first thought.
Table 14—Payoffs of the Announcers, by Treatment
Mean profits Median profits
Treatment 4  421 tokens  441 tokens
Treatment 5  404 tokens  384 tokens
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Battle-of-the-Sexes mis-coordination type of problem switched to transmitting the 
value of x in a coarse manner, while the remaining Announcers kept using the truth-
telling strategy which performed relatively well. In addition to 9 Announcers who 
changed their strategy in the course of the experiment, we observe that a large frac-
tion of Announcers, 6 out of 17 (35 percent), are sophisticated enough to foresee the 
asymmetry problem in advance and implement the strategy that corrects for it from 
the beginning of the experiment. The remaining 2 Announcers (12 percent) used 
the first couple of rounds to try out different nontruthful announcements and then 
converged to using their noninvertible strategy.
Finally, we note that when x takes values of 1 or 3, the Announcer that masks 
the value of x and reports “x is 2” or “x is 1, 2, or 3” or “x is 1 or 3” cannot achieve 
lower coordination rates (and thus lower payoff) than the one that reveals the actual 
value of x by reporting x = 1 or x = 3.21 In other words, we expect that any of 
the Words strategies used by our subject Announcers performs at least as well as 
the truth-telling strategy. Table 15 reports the coordination rates and the fraction of 
times Players played the (ES, ES) equilibrium when the true value of x was 1 or 3 
and different announcements were made.
As we can see from Table 15, our expectations were borne out. The Announcers 
that masked payoff asymmetry by using Strategies B1, B4, B5, or B6 achieved 
strictly higher coordination rates and, thus, higher total welfare than those that used 
Strategy A1 and truthfully reported x = 1 or x = 3. Moreover, the most effective 
way of disguising payoff asymmetry was to announce that “x is 1, 2, or 3” when x 
was smaller than four. Announcers that used this type of Words strategy achieved 
coordination rate of 91 percent in all rounds and 100 percent in the last five rounds, 
with the majority of the coordination occurring on the (ES, ES) equilibrium (70 
percent in all rounds and 100 percent in the last five rounds). On the contrary, if 
Players were told that “x is 1” or “x is 3” when truth-telling strategy A1 was used, 
they coordinated on one of the equilibria only 42 percent of the times in all 20 and 
41 percent in the last 5 rounds.
We conclude this section by noting that our subject Announcers exhibited an 
amazing degree of sophistication. Most human Announcers started by using the 
truthful strategy. However, depending on the performance of the Players, a signifi-
cant fraction of subject Announcers switched to using vague communication strate-
gies that masks payoff asymmetry and facilitated coordination through the use of 
the focal points. In other words, human Announcers are capable of identifying the 
asymmetry problem and finding a way to correct for it by using coarse announce-
ment strategies.
HYPOTHESIS 7: “Equality in Expectations.”
Finally, we are interested in understanding what triggers the use of the focal point 
when coarse information is used: is it the uncertainty about the game being played? 
or is it the symmetry of the expected payoffs? To distinguish between the two pos-
sible explanations, we go back to the Computerized-Announcer treatment and look 
21 In this exercise, we concentrate on the announcement strategies that were used by more than one Announcer, 
and thus abstract from strategies A2, B2, and B3.
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at the performance of subjects in the Word s modified treatment (Treatment 6). Hence, 
when “x is low” is announced, the Players expect to be playing Γ(11⁄6) which has 
unequal payoffs (8.33 to one player and 8.83 to another one).
As Table 16 shows, even in the last 5 rounds of the Word s modified treatment when 
words are no more vague, subjects played the (ES, ES) equilibrium only 49 per-
cent of the time after announcement “x is low” (41 percent in the first 15 rounds). 
These coordination rates can be compared to the ones reported in Table 8, which 
presents the distribution of outcomes in the Words treatment when “x is low” is 
announced and the Players expect to be playing Γ(2) with symmetric payoffs. Here 
subjects play the (ES, ES) equilibrium much more often: 57 percent in the first 15 
rounds and 74 percent in the last 5 rounds in the Words treatment. Put differently, 
the slight asymmetry in expected payoffs in the Word s modified treatment is enough 
to destroy the power of salient equilibrium and interfere with coordination.
Figure 3 presents the distribution of the individual behavior of subjects 
after the announcement “x is low” in the last five rounds of the Words and the 
Word s modified treatments.22
As Figure 3 shows, when “x is low” is announced only 38 percent of subjects 
always play the focal Empire State strategy in the Word s modified treatment, while this 
fraction is much higher in the Words treatment (about 73 percent). The null that 
these samples come from the same population is rejected by the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test ( p = 0.0041). This result suggests that what triggers the use of the focal 
strategies is not the uncertainty about the game being played but the symmetry in the 
expected payoffs of the Players.
22 There are 44 observations in the histogram on the left (Words treatment) and 42 observations in the histogram 
on the right (Word s modified treatment).
Table 15—Coordination Rates when x Takes Values 1 and 3  
(total number of observations in each case is reported in the parentheses)
Coordination rates (ES, ES) play
Announcements All rounds Last 5 rounds All rounds Last 5 rounds
Strategy B1: “x is 2” 81% 
(70 observations)
90% 
(20 observations)
80% 
(70 observations)
90% 
(20 observations)
Strategies B4 and B5: “x is 1, 2, or 3” 91% 
(23 observations)
100% 
(7 observations)
70% 
(23 observations)
100% 
(7 observations)
Strategy B6: “x is 1 or 3” 75% 
(24 observations)
83% 
(6 observations)
75% 
(24 observations)
83% 
(6 observations)
Strategy A1: “x is 1” or “x is 3” 42% 
(158 observations)
41% 
(37 observations)
31% 
(158 observations)
24% 
(37 observations)
Table 16—Distribution of Outcomes in the Word s modified Treatment
Word s modified : “x is low” Word s modified : “x is low”
first 15 rounds (245 obs) last 5 rounds (79 obs)
ES AXA ES AXA
ES 41% 27% ES 49% 23%
AXA 20% 11% AXA 20% 8%
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To conclude, our results indicate that a vague strategy enhances coordination by 
increasing the use of salient strategies only if it totally masks payoff asymmetry 
as it does in the Words treatment. Merely reducing asymmetry, as it does in the 
Word s modified treatment, is not enough to restore the power of focal points and 
increase coordination.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to make one simple point which is that even 
when there are no strategic tensions between a sender and receiver in a communica-
tion game, it still may be beneficial for the sender to communicate in a imprecise 
manner. The reason for this is that in situations where payoff asymmetry is likely 
to interfere with coordination (as in the Battle-of-the-Sexes game), being ambigu-
ous or vague about the game being played and its payoffs may help to mask this 
underlying inequality and allow players to focus on those aspects of the problem 
that aid coordination such as the saliency of the strategy labels. While the benefits 
of being vague are never as high as those associated with being ambiguous, our 
results do indicate that we lose relatively little by the vagueness of our language and 
that human announcers gain an appreciation of the fact that payoff inequality is best 
disguised and attempt to do so.
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